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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America offers its citizens broad protec-
tions for speech.1  Of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, free 
speech is one of our most important.2  Extensive scholarship offers 
four main theories justifying the right of free speech.3
First, free speech is necessary for self-government and democ-
racy.4  It is vital to our ability to self-govern, because this freedom 
allows the dissemination of information about politics and policies 
among voters.5  In order for voters to arrive at the correct public pol-
icy and ultimately choose the correct candidate, the free exchange of 
ideas is vital.6  Some scholars have argued that in order for a democ-
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, The 
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  Id. 
 2 See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA 
L. REV. 705, 742 (2004) (citing the Free Speech Clause as one of the most important 
provisions of the Constitution). 
 3 Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130–55 (1989) 
(categorizing, explaining and challenging the accuracy and value of each of the dif-
ferent justifications). 
 4 Id. at 148 (“No doubt valid consent to something can often be based on less 
than full information, but a problem arises when the authority that seeks consent 
also controls available information.  If someone asks my agreement to a course of ac-
tion and then actively conceals much relevant information that would affect my 
judgment, my ‘consent’ is of lessened or no effect.”). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
SMITH 1-9-06 FINAL.DOC 1/9/2006  4:51:59 PM 
628 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:627 
 
racy to function and for self-government to be effective, there can be 
no restrictions on the right of free speech.7
A second justification advanced for the protection of speech is 
that the free exchange of ideas allows the truth to emerge.8  In his 
dissent in Abrams v. United States,9 Justice Holmes coined the term 
“marketplace of ideas,” arguing that the ultimate test of an idea, re-
gardless of whether it was right or true, was whether it was accepted 
above other ideas, which had an equal right to be heard.10  Thus, 
many consider free speech vital to the discovery of truth, and phi-
losophers as well as legal scholars embrace this idea.11
A third justification for free speech is that it is necessary for 
autonomy.12  Allowing people to freely express themselves allows 
them to define themselves, which in and of itself has value.13  Finally, 
scholars argue that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech 
promotes tolerance.14  Permitting citizens to engage in the speech of 
their choice encourages tolerance of diverse viewpoints.15
Although these theories overlap in some areas, most scholars 
agree on the importance of free speech to self-government.16  Thus, 
 7 See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245 (arguing that there should be no limits on the First Amendment, even on 
private speech such as art and literature, because although such speech does not de-
velop political knowledge, it helps voters acquire intelligence). 
 8 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 130. 
 9 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 10 Id. at 630 (arguing “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market”). 
 11 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin 
Books 1982) (1859) (arguing that suppressing speech deprives men of the truth of 
an idea, or if the idea is false, the ability to compare this false idea with the truth in 
order to gain perception). 
 12 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 143 (“By affording people an opportunity to hear 
and digest competing positions and to explore options in conversations with others, 
freedom of discussion is thought to promote independent judgment and considerate 
decision, what might be characterized as autonomy.”). 
 13 See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 
(1982) (arguing that the sole value of the First Amendment is its role in self-
realization, a process by which an individual realizes his potential or commands his 
destiny). 
 14 Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 146–47 (“The basic idea is that if we are forced to 
acknowledge the right of detested groups to speak, we are taught the lesson that we 
should be tolerant of the opinions and behavior of those who are not like us.”). 
 15 Id. 
 16 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2 
(2d ed. 2002). 
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political speech is generally accorded the greatest protection possible 
under the First Amendment.17
Nevertheless, courts have recognized some restrictions on the 
right of free speech, even political speech.18  First Amendment juris-
prudence struggles with drawing appropriate lines as to which speech 
is protected and which is not.19  As security concerns have increased 
in the last decade, the desire to feel safe has led to the sacrifice of 
some First Amendment protections.  Federal courts have repeatedly 
confronted the issue of balancing the right of free speech with pro-
viding a safe environment in the last two decades.20  This conflict has 
arisen pursuant to protests of many issues, including abortion, war, 
and our current president.21
This Comment focuses on the extent to which security concerns 
have limited the free access to public forums for speech and altered 
judicial standards for restrictions on speech.  Part II presents the cur-
rent law on the right of access in public forums, and Part III explores 
the causes for increasing concerns for security.  In Part IV, this Com-
ment describes the approach taken to protect abortion clinics, while 
still allowing for maximum protection of protesters’ First Amend-
ment freedoms.  Part V explores the recent problems stemming from 
the application of the current standard to First Amendment chal-
lenges for political speech in public forums.  Part VI applies the 
standard set forth in First Amendment challenges by protesters at 
abortion clinics to recent case law and determines the difference in 
outcome that a more protective standard produces.  Part VII con-
cludes by urging the implementation of a standard that is more 
protective of speech than current law by requiring the government to 
justify the restrictions it places on access to public forums by demon-
strating that it has chosen the least restrictive alternative to advance 
its security concern. 
 17 Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 313–15 (1992) (“The 
belief that politics lies at the core of the amendment is an outgrowth of the more 
general structural commitment to deliberative democracy.  The concern for ensuring 
the preconditions for deliberation among the citizenry is closely associated with this 
commitment.”). 
 18 See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 124–81 and accompanying text. 
 21 Id. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURISPRUDENCE RESTRICTING ACCESS  
TO PUBLIC FORUMS—THE “TIME, PLACE  
AND MANNER” STANDARD 
Supreme Court opinions that deal with the issue of access to 
public forums underscore the notion that this right is necessary to fa-
cilitate effective self-government.22  Earlier opinions reflected the 
notion that free access to public forums was a basic right of citizen-
ship.23  In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,24 the Court 
declared unconstitutional a New Jersey statute that required the ap-
proval of a local police chief for leasing any hall or space.25  The 
government enforced this law to prevent members of the Communist 
party from holding meetings.26  Justice Roberts wrote a plurality opin-
ion and invalidated the law, writing that places such as halls and parks 
should belong to the people: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out 
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicat-
ing thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. 
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, 
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the 
streets and parks for communication of views on national ques-
tions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but 
relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general 
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and 
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be 
abridged or denied.27
The Court recognized the importance of the right of free assembly in 
public places, but also acknowledged that the right of such assembly 
could be limited at times.28  Later Supreme Court decisions would 
struggle with the appropriate limits to place on this freedom.29
 22 See infra notes 23–41 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 501 (1939) (addressing the 
constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that prohibited citizens from meeting in pub-
lic spaces without the permission of the local government). 
 24 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 25 Id. at 516. 
 26 Id. at 501. 
 27 Id. at 515. 
 28 Id. at 516. 
 29 See infra notes 31–41 and accompanying text. 
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In 1941, only two years after the Hague decision, the Supreme 
Court in Cox v. New Hampshire30 upheld a statute challenged by a 
group of Jehovah’s Witnesses wishing to hold a parade and pass out 
materials.31  The Court enunciated the standard by which constitu-
tional challenges to restrictions on access to public forums would be 
measured: 
 If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public 
streets for parades or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot 
be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair dis-
crimination, to time, place and manner in relation to the other 
proper uses of the streets. We find it impossible to say that the 
limited authority conferred by the licensing provisions of the stat-
ute in question as thus construed by the state court contravened 
any constitutional right.32
Thus, the Cox Court crafted the standard that restrictions on speech 
in public places were constitutional as long as the restrictions were 
reasonable with regard to time, place, and manner.33  Once the Court 
determined that the ability to regulate the use of places such as 
streets, parks, and other public forums was properly within the State’s 
power, it adopted a deferential standard to the State’s judgment in 
such matters.34
The Supreme Court refined the test over the years, but even with 
the refinements the Court remained deferential to restrictions on the 
use of parks and other public forums.  In Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence,35 the Court upheld the National Park Service’s 
decision to prohibit protestors from sleeping in parts of Lafayette 
Park, as a demonstration against the plight of the homeless.36  The 
majority opinion, authored by Justice White, reiterated the standard 
for restrictions on speech.37  The Court reaffirmed that reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions were proper.38  The Court, how-
ever, clarified the additional requirements that the regulations of 
speech could not be content-based, that they must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve a significant governmental interest and that there be 
 30 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
 31 Id. at 570–71. 
 32 Id. at 576. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 36 Id. at 289. 
 37 Id. at 293. 
 38 Id. 
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alternative channels for communication of the information.39  While 
this could be viewed as an expansion in speech protection, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall pointed out, in dissent, the inadequacy of this 
protection.40  The Justices argued that once a regulation is found to 
be content-neutral, the level of scrutiny is minimal, offering little pro-
tection for important forms of speech.41
While the Court’s constitutional standard for permit and guide-
line schemes looks at whether the regulation is narrowly tailored, 
under current authority the State does not need to employ the least 
restrictive alternative to advance its legitimate concerns.42  In fact, the 
Court expressly stated that it does not require such a showing for a 
regulation to pass constitutional muster.43  In Ward v. Rock Against Ra-
cism, an association, Rock Against Racism (RAR), dedicated to the 
promotion of anti-racist views, challenged a New York City guideline 
that controlled the volume of sound amplification at public events.44  
Due to problems with excessive noise in the past, the City’s guidelines 
controlled sound amplification for events at Naumberg Bandshell, 
where the RAR event was to take place.45  RAR sought an injunction 
that would permit it to use its own equipment and technician.46  In 
prior years, the City permitted RAR this autonomy.47  The district 
court denied the injunction, but the Second Circuit reversed.48
Although the guideline was content-neutral, served a significant 
governmental interest, and left open ample alternative channels of 
communication, the Second Circuit struck down the guideline be-
cause the City had not used the least restrictive alternative for 
controlling the sound volume at the event.49  In reversing the Second 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 41 Clark, 468 U.S. at 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[b]y narrowly 
limiting its concern to whether a given regulation creates a content-based distinction, 
the Court has seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral restrictions are also 
capable of unnecessarily restricting protected expressive activity”). 
 42 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 43 Id. at 782. 
 44 Id. at 787. 
 45 Id. at 785.  The guideline provided that the “Department of Parks and Recrea-
tion is to be the sole and only provider of sound amplification, including though not 
limited to amplifiers, speakers, monitors, microphones, and processors.”  Id. at 788. 
 46 Id. at 787–88. 
 47 Ward, 491 U.S. at 787. 
 48 Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 49 Id. at 370 (holding that the guideline “must be the least intrusive upon the 
freedom of expression as is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose of 
the regulation” and offering several less restrictive methods of achieving the City’s 
goal). 
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Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court held that its test did not re-
quire use of the least restrictive alternative when regulating speech in 
public forums: 
The requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as 
the regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest 
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, 
and the means chosen are not substantially broader than 
necessary to achieve that interest. If these standards are 
met, courts should defer to the government’s reasonable 
determination.50
Thus, the Court held that when hearing challenges based on access 
to public forums, courts need not inquire whether the government’s 
objective could be accomplished in a less restrictive manner.51
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the Court had signifi-
cantly lessened the constitutional protection for speech.52  Justice 
Marshall was concerned that the majority’s opinion articulated a new 
standard for the protection of speech that replaced scrutiny with 
“mandatory deference.”53  Furthermore, he reasoned that if the lower 
courts should no longer inquire whether the goals of the regulation 
could be achieved in a less intrusive manner, they would be unable to 
determine whether the government had adopted a regulation that 
burdened more speech than necessary.54
Thus, the “time, place, and manner” standard does not require 
strict scrutiny by the courts.55  Only when there are no standards for 
issuing permits for public forums and the permit scheme is left fully 
to the discretion of a public official should a court apply strict scru-
tiny to a restriction on speech.56  This additional requirement of 
actual, set standards for the issuance of permits affords more protec-
tion for speech, but after Ward, there is no requirement that the 
government employ the least restrictive alternative to achieve its ob-
jectives. 
 50 Ward, 491 U.S. at 782–83 (syllabus). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 807. 
 55 Id. at 800 (majority opinion). 
 56 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969) (“Even when 
the use of its public streets and sidewalks is involved, therefore, a municipality may 
not empower its licensing officials to roam essentially at will, dispensing or withhold-
ing permission to speak, assemble, picket, or parade according to their own opinions 
regarding the potential effect of the activity in question on the ‘welfare,’ ‘decency,’ 
or ‘morals’ of the community.”).
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III. THE RISE OF SECURITY CONCERNS 
In Ward, the Supreme Court left no doubt that lower courts 
need not require use of the least restrictive alternative in order to 
uphold a government restriction of free access to a public forum.57  
More recent events have generated an increase in anxiety over large 
protests, leading to a heightened desire to control or prevent such 
demonstrations from taking place.58
Although many cite the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) as 
the cause of increased security concerns regarding access to public 
forums for demonstrations and protests, anxiety about safety pre-
dated 9/11.59  More than any other event in the last half-century, or 
quite likely any event in the history of this nation, however, the events 
of 9/11 have increased the cause for security concerns.  These events 
have dominated discussions of safety, and prevention of another ter-
rorist attack is paramount in any regulation or restriction on access to 
a public forum.  Still, 9/11 brought a climax to the already growing 
anxiety over safety. 
For example, in Seattle, Washington in late 1999, the protests 
against the World Trade Organization (WTO)60 summit threw the 
city into chaos.61  The protest drew together many different organiza-
tions and constituencies to demonstrate and disrupt the meetings of 
the world’s most influential trade-governing bodies.62
The WTO summit in Seattle began on November 29, 1999, and 
the protests began that same day.63  Over 1400 organizations joined 
the protests, viewing the talks as a tool for the wealthy to eliminate 
jobs.64  The protests lasted for five full days and eventually disrupted 
the summit on December 3, 1999.  The protests closed the central 
business district of Seattle and effected a great deal of damage and 
 57 Ward, 491 U.S. at 782. 
 58 See infra notes 59–77 and accompanying text. 
 59 See infra notes 60–77 and accompanying text. 
 60 The World Trade Organization is an international body that promulgates rules 
dealing with trade among nations.  World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 
2005). 
 61 The WTO History Project, WTO History Project, http://depts.washington. 
edu/wtohist/index.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). 
 62 The WTO History Project, Day One: November 29, 1999, http://depts.washing 
ton.edu/wtohist/day1.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005) 
 63 The WTO History Project, About the Project, http://depts.washington.edu/ 
wtohist/about_project.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). 
 64 The WTO History Project, Introduction to the Protests, http://depts.washing 
ton.edu/wtohist/intro.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). 
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destruction on the city.65  The protests also exposed the Seattle police 
force’s lack of adequate preparation for managing the planned dem-
onstration.66  There was also massive public outrage at the tactics the 
police used to control the protesters, which included clearing crowds 
with tear gas.67  These tactics elicited increasingly violent and destruc-
tive responses from the protesters.68  As the days passed, the police 
arrested growing numbers of protesters, until nearly 600 people were 
jailed.69  The summit was eventually cancelled, due to the destruction 
and violence in the city, compounded by the Seattle Police Depart-
ment’s inability to protect the WTO dignitaries’ safety.70
Also prior to 9/11, increasing concern for security arose in reac-
tion to the continued violence at abortion clinics.  Although clinics 
are more physically permanent targets than the WTO summit, the 
continuing incidents of violence involving them underscore concerns 
for safety.71  Abortion has been a major political issue since 1973, 
when the Supreme Court determined that abortion was a fundamen-
tal right in Roe v. Wade.72  Since the Roe decision, opposition to 
abortion has grown more zealous causing increased incidents of vio-
lence on abortion clinics,73 including bombings and fires.74
In other instances, abortion protesters were able to “blockade” 
the clinics by having enough demonstrators present at the clinic to 
completely prevent access to it.75  In Cherry Hill, New Jersey, a block-
ade of this nature was successful in overwhelming police and other 
law enforcement officials and shutting the clinic down for a day.76  
These violent and zealous demonstrations are not only intimidating 
and disruptive, but they are expensive as well.77  Situations such as 
 65 The WTO History Project, Repercussions, http://depts.washington.edu/wtoh 
ist/Repercussions.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 The WTO History Project, Day Five: December 3, 1999, http://depts.washingt 
on.edu/wtohist/day5.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 72 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 73 Stephen J. Hedges et al., Abortion: Who’s Behind the Violence?, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Nov. 14, 1994, at 50. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Fay Clayton & Sara N. Love, NOW v. Scheidler: Protecting Women’s Access to Re-
productive Health Services, 62 ALB. L. REV. 967, 977 (1999). 
 76 Id. at 987. 
 77 See, e.g., Hedges et. al., supra note 73, at 55 (documenting the cost of each 
bombing or other violent act against a clinic, the minimum of which is $300,000 and 
in some instances may exceed $1 million). 
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these caused many states to begin enacting “buffer zones” around 
clinics to help ensure the safety of clinic personnel and patients.  
These zones were soon challenged as violations of First Amendment 
freedoms.78
IV. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY ISSUES  
AT ABORTION CLINICS 
Due to the concern about increasing incidents of violence at 
abortion clinics, Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrances Act (FACE).79  States also enacted legislation and utilized 
other tools to offer protection to abortion clinics and patients seeking 
services at these facilities.80  Abortion protesters challenged the limits 
placed on demonstrations outside clinics as violative of their First 
Amendment rights. 
A.  The Madsen Test 
When anti-abortion demonstrations outside clinics continued to 
have a negative effect on the clinics and the women trying to access 
them, a Florida court issued an injunction that established a thirty-six-
foot buffer zone around the clinic, enjoining demonstrators from 
coming within a certain distance of the clinics.81  The injunction, 
which was later broadened to provide more protection for the clin-
ics,82 was challenged in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. as a 
violation of the demonstrators’ rights under the First Amendment.83  
The Court first noted that its traditional time, place, and manner test 
for restrictions on speech would not provide the scrutiny this case re-
quired because the restriction challenged was an injunction, rather 
than an ordinance.84  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, reasoned that an injunction differs from a statute or ordinance 
and therefore carries a greater risk of censorship.85  First, unlike an 
 78 See infra notes 79–117 and accompanying text.  
 79 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000) (providing penalties for anyone who attempts to 
threaten or intimidate an individual who endeavors to procure reproductive ser-
vices). 
 80 For example, Colorado passed legislation protecting access to clinics, which 
was later challenged.  See infra notes 112–17. 
 81 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994). 
 82 Id. at 758. 
 83 Id. at 753. 
 84 Id. at 765 (“Accordingly, when evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we 
think that our standard time, place, and manner analysis is not sufficiently rigor-
ous.”). 
 85 Id. at 764. 
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ordinance, an injunction is a judicial decree and not a reflection of a 
policy choice by the legislature.86  Next, because a judge crafts an in-
junction, there is a greater risk of discriminatory enforcement.87  
Because of this increased risk of censorship, the Court applied a 
more stringent analysis to the injunction, and it inquired “whether 
the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech 
than necessary to serve a significant government interest.”88
In the Court’s analysis of the injunction, this heightened scrutiny 
played a critical role in the Court’s decision to strike down portions 
of the injunction, while upholding others.89  First, the Court ad-
dressed the thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the clinic, an area 
within which protesters were prohibited from protesting and picket-
ing.90  The Court upheld this portion of the injunction while noting 
that the protesters would still be seen and heard from areas outside 
the buffer zone.91  Because the protesters still had the ability to make 
their message heard, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that this as-
pect of the injunction burdened no more speech than necessary to 
achieve the government’s interest.92  The majority also upheld the 
Florida court’s ban on sound amplification devices, as well as chant-
ing and other such forms of protest to prevent noise-levels around 
the clinic from getting too high.93  The Court again determined that 
these restrictions burdened no more speech than was necessary to 
achieve the government’s objective of ensuring the health and safety 
of the clinic’s patients.94
Under this heightened standard of review, however, the majority 
also found that certain portions of the injunction burdened more 
speech than was necessary to achieve the government’s objectives.95  
The Florida state court placed a ban on all “images observable” out-
side the clinic in order to stop threats to patients and their families.96  
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the state court could 
 86 Id. 
 87 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764. 
 88 Id. at 765. 
 89 Id. at 768–76. 
 90 Id. at 768. 
 91 Id. at 770 (“Protesters standing across the narrow street from the clinic can still 
be seen and heard from the clinic parking lots.”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 773. 
 96 Id.  
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have prohibited threats, rather than all such images.97  Thus, the 
Court found this provision to burden more speech than necessary.98   
The Madsen Court also struck down a provision of the injunction 
that prohibited protesters from physically approaching any person 
entering the clinic unless such person initiated an interaction or 
showed a desire to interact first.99  Again, the majority held that such 
a prohibition was too broad a measure to prevent intimidation and 
that the same end could be achieved through narrower and less re-
strictive means.100  Finally, under this standard of review, the Court 
struck down a prohibition on protesting and demonstrating within 
300 feet of the clinic staff’s homes.101  The majority once again de-
termined that there was a narrower way of accomplishing the stated 
goal of achieving tranquility and peace at the homes of these indi-
viduals.102
Only under this heightened level of scrutiny does the Court de-
termine whether the government’s objectives could be accomplished 
in a less restrictive manner.  The Court applied this more rigorous 
test due to the dangers of an injunction burdening more speech than 
necessary.  The Court found that these dangers were greater in the 
context of an injunction, rather than an ordinance.103  If the Court 
simply used the “time, place, and manner” standard, the only ques-
tion for the Court would have been whether the restriction was 
reasonable and would have scrutinized the restriction only under its 
rational basis review.  Under a more traditional analysis, once a court 
concludes that the restriction was reasonable and the government’s 
objective important, it should look no further to see if the goal could 
be accomplished through less restrictive means. 
B. After Madsen 
The constitutionality of placing limits on protesters’ ability to 
demonstrate outside of abortion clinics was revisited by the Supreme 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773. 
 100 Id. at 774 (holding that “[a]bsent evidence that the protesters’ speech is inde-
pendently proscribable (i.e., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with 
violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, this provision can-
not stand”). 
 101 Id. at 775. 
 102 Id. (offering some examples of narrower bans which would accomplish the 
same or similar result, such as limitations on time and duration of picketing, as well 
as the number of picketers). 
 103 See supra notes 85–101. 
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Court in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York.104  Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, reaffirmed the Madsen 
test105 and upheld the implementation of a fixed buffer zone around 
clinics, while striking down a floating buffer zone.106  In its decision 
that a floating, rather than a fixed, buffer zone was unconstitutional, 
the Court determined that the uncertainty of where the zone reached 
and extended was likely to burden more speech than necessary to 
achieve the government’s interest.107
Furthermore, the Court offered greater flexibility for the Madsen 
test.  The petitioners also challenged the injunction issued by the dis-
trict court because the court did not attempt to issue a “non speech-
restrictive” injunction first, as the state court did in Madsen.108  The 
Court, however, explicitly said that it was not necessary to attempt a 
“non-speech-restrictive” remedy before issuing a “speech-restrictive” 
one.109  This flexibility in issuing an injunction or crafting a remedy is 
important in providing a balance between protecting First Amend-
ment freedoms and offering increased security.  The Court attempted 
to offer the government a variety of remedies to ensure safety, as long 
as it utilized the least restrictive one.  This effort is revealed by the 
Court’s decision not to limit governments by requiring them to first 
attempt the use of a “non-speech-restrictive” limitation before using a 
“speech-restrictive” one.110
In Hill v. Colorado,111 the Court addressed another First Amend-
ment challenge that limited protesters’ access to public forums when 
the forum they sought was an area outside of an abortion clinic.112  In 
this case, however, the restriction challenged was a Colorado statute, 
 104 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 105 Id. at 370–71. The Court reaffirmed that the test in this context was not the 
typical “time, place, and manner” test when the challenged restriction was an injunc-
tion.  Id.  “The test instead, we held, is ‘whether the challenged provisions of the 
injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government 
interest.’”  Id. at 371 (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765). 
 106 Id. at 379. The floating buffer zone was a zone around any person entering or 
exiting the clinic that any uninvited person was prohibited from entering.  Id. at 378. 
 107 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 379.  The Court cited a lack of certainty on the part of the 
protesters about whether they were in compliance with the injunction or not.  Id. at 
378.  “This lack of certainty leads to a substantial risk that much more speech will be 
burdened than the injunction by its terms prohibits.”  Id. 
 108 Id. at 382. 
 109 Id. at 382–83. 
 110 Id. at 382. 
 111 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
 112 Id. at 707–08. 
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rather than an injunction like in Madsen and Schenck.113  Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the majority, upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute.114  In doing so, he declined to extend Madsen’s requirement 
of the least restrictive alternative outside the context of an injunc-
tion.115
Although the Court declined to use the standard set forth in 
Madsen as the test in Hill, its analysis indicated that the statute would 
pass constitutional muster if viewed under a more scrutinizing lens.  
For example, the majority mentioned restrictions that were upheld in 
Madsen under its stricter test that were not present before the Court 
in Hill, such as limitations on the number of speakers or sound am-
plification devices.116  In fact, the majority even suggested that the 
statute facilitated communication of the protesters’ message, rather 
than hindering it, because it forced those protesters, whose aggressive 
tactics discouraged thoughtful discussion, to tone down their ef-
forts.117  Thus, although the Court declined to extend the more 
rigorous standard set forth in Madsen, there is some evidence that the 
statute would pass muster under the stricter level of scrutiny and still 
allow the government to achieve the same end.  The difference in the 
application of tests may not affect the outcome in this case; however, 
the Court’s decision in Hill, declining to extend the applicability of 
Madsen, could have a bearing on future cases involving First Amend-
ment challenges. 
V. THE RESULT OF A FAILURE TO REQUIRE THE  
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE 
Clearly, security concerns are very real.  Because access to public 
forums and the right of free speech are so fundamental to our ability 
 113 Id. at 707 (“The specific section of the statute that is challenged, COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999), makes it unlawful within the regulated areas for any per-
son to ‘knowingly approach’ within eight feet of another person, without that 
person's consent, ‘for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a  
sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other per- 
son . . . .’”).
 114 Id. at 714. 
 115 Id. at 731 (holding “[i]t is precisely because the Colorado Legislature made a 
general policy choice that the statute is assessed under the constitutional standard set 
forth in Ward, . . . rather than a more strict standard” and citing Madsen as the guide 
for this stricter standard).
 116 Id. at 726–27 (citing the fact that the statute does not include the use of the 
“floating buffer zones” the Court rejected in Schenck, as well as the inclusion of a 
mens rea component for any protester who invades the space of a person seeking 
treatment or care at the clinic). 
 117 Id. at 727. 
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to self-govern, however, security concerns need to be tempered with 
the ability to disseminate knowledge.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ward did not require the use of the least restrictive alternative with 
regard to limits on access to public forums;118 thus, current doctrine 
does not provide a strong counter-balancing interest to such restric-
tions.  With increasing safety concerns, many more restrictions on 
valuable speech will become reasonable “time, place, and manner” 
restrictions.  Without a least restrictive alternative requirement, these 
reasonable “time, place, and manner” restrictions could result in 
swallowing valuable speech that should be protected by the First 
Amendment. 
Indeed, the concerns of the dissenting Justices in Clark119 and 
Ward120 have played out to some extent in later case law.121  The dis-
senting Justices in both cases feared that the constitutional standard 
for judging these restrictions was too deferential to the govern-
ment.122
It will be enough, therefore, that the challenged regulation 
advances the government’s interest only in the slightest, for 
any differential burden on speech that results does not en-
ter the calculus. Despite its protestations to the contrary, 
the majority thus has abandoned the requirement that re-
strictions on speech be narrowly tailored in any ordinary 
use of the phrase.123
The fact that the Court no longer required that the restrictions on 
access to public forums be narrowly tailored makes it much easier for 
the government to justify such regulations. 
A. United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York124
Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a coalition of local and na-
tional organizations wished to demonstrate against the war in front of 
the United Nations in New York City.125  When the City declined to 
 118 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782 (1989). 
 119 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 301–16 (1984) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). 
 120 Ward, 491 U.S. at 803–12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 121 See infra notes 125–81 and accompanying text. 
 122 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 803 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinions in both cases signifi-
cantly lowered the protection for important speech and fearing that the decisions 
would result in the suppression of valuable speech). 
 123 Ward, 491 U.S. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 124 243 F. Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 125 James Barron, Critical of Judge's Ruling, Antiwar Protesters Brace for Rally, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at B1. 
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issue a permit for this demonstration, the coalition challenged that 
action as a violation of their First Amendment freedoms.126  The dis-
trict court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
holding that the City’s action—preventing the demonstration at that 
time and place—did not violate United for Peace and Justice’s First 
Amendment rights.127  In determining whether the City’s denial of a 
permit infringed upon the group’s constitutional freedoms, the court 
first noted the heightened awareness of security in Manhattan, and 
specifically around the United Nations building, since 9/11.128  When 
assessing whether the City’s restriction left open ample alternatives 
for communication, the court pointed out different alternatives for 
United for Peace and Justice,129 some of which were visible from the 
United Nations Building.130  Nevertheless, the court had little sympa-
thy for the anti-war demonstration’s desire to be heard in front of the 
building.131  Indeed, as an anti-war protest, a march in front of the 
United Nations building would have provided the demonstrators a 
unique opportunity to communicate the group’s message, and the 
court did not acknowledge the inadequacy of other possible fo-
rums.132  The court assessed the City’s stationary rally alternative and 
deemed that alternative to be an adequate substitute for the pro-
posed march.133  Furthermore, after examining the alternative modes 
of communication, the court deemed them acceptable.134  In con-
cluding its opinion, the court cited to Ward, and used the Supreme 
Court’s language for support that the alternative modes of communi-
cation need not be “the least restrictive alternative.”135
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision.136  The Second Circuit determined that while 
the right to engage in political protest is protected, there are limits 
on this right.137  When the court determined that the City’s offer of 
 126 United for Peace and Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 21. 
 127 Id. at 31. 
 128 Id. at 24. 
 129 Id. at 25. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See generally, Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2006) (discussing how confining protesters in certain spaces has damaging 
effects on expressive conduct). 
 133 United for Peace and Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 32 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782 (1989)). 
 136 United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 323 F.3d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
 137 Id. at 176. 
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the stationary rally was appropriate the court also concluded that it 
was narrowly tailored, albeit not the least restrictive alternative.138  
The Second Circuit also cited Ward for support in its decision that 
while the City’s restrictions needed to be narrowly tailored, “they 
‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means’ of regulat-
ing speech.”139  The court also agreed with the district court’s 
conclusion that the City’s decision to prohibit a march in favor of the 
stationary rally was proper.140  The Second Circuit defended the deci-
sion: 
 This case, and the district court’s decision, are not as un-
usual or as unprecedented as some have suggested. . . . We 
are ever mindful of our role in the preservation of our sys-
tem of ordered liberty, especially in times of war.  Not every 
regulation or governmental action designed to protect the 
public safety will necessarily win the imprimatur of the 
courts.141
Although the court attempted to reassure itself and others that there 
will still be adequate protection for fundamental First Amendment 
freedoms, such as the right of political protest, the ultimate outcome 
of the case is unsettling.  The court’s decision gives reason for appre-
hension because it illustrates the ability of security concerns to 
squelch potentially valuable political speech, without even an investi-
gation into how such speech could be conveyed in a safe manner. 
Although both courts cited to other First Amendment decisions 
by the Supreme Court, the decision in Ward validated the district 
court and the Second Circuit’s less rigorous inquiries into the alter-
natives the City offered to the protesters.142  This sort of repression is 
particularly troubling in a time leading up to our decision to invade 
another country, and could potentially infringe upon our ability to 
self-govern.143
 138 Id. at 177. 
 139 Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798) 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 177–78. 
 142 United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 32 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 143 See Nick Suplina, Note, Crowd Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, 
Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395 (2005) (addressing 
the inadequacy of the time, place, and manner standard in protecting protests); see 
also Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial 
Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795 (2004) (arguing that the 
courts should not immediately defer to other branches of government during times 
of war). 
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B.  National Council of Arab Americans v. City of New York144
The Republican National Convention generated another exam-
ple of the tension between the concerns for security and the right of 
access to public forums.  Before the convention, demonstrators pro-
tested the Bush Administration and its policies.145  For example, prior 
to the convention, the police in New York arrested more than one 
hundred protesters on bicycles who were riding to express disap-
proval of the Administration’s treatment of the environment.146  The 
National Council of Arab Americans and United for Peace and Jus-
tice both sought large venues for demonstrations in Central Park 
held on consecutive days.147  The New York City Parks Department 
denied each of their requests for a permit, as well as the respective 
appeals.148  United for Peace and Justice initially accepted the West 
Side Highway as an alternate site for its march, but then rejected the 
alternative when the City refused to supply certain amenities like wa-
ter and shuttle buses.149
The media followed the struggle between the City and the pro-
test groups.  Two general opinions emerged.  One point of view was 
that the City was trying to manage the protests too closely, and by lim-
iting them to such a great degree, removed the power of the 
protest.150  Others, however, felt that the protesters had their day in 
court151 and that the rights of the protesters must not outweigh the 
rights of other citizens.152  Thus, it was up to the courts to determine 
whether to allow the protests to take place.153
 144 331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
 145 See infra notes 146–52 and accompanying text. 
 146 Randal C. Archibold, 100 Cyclists Are Arrested as Thousands Ride in Protest, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at B1. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Susan Saulny, Judge Bars Big Rally in Park, but Protest March Is Still Set, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2004, at B1. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Michael Slackman, If a Protest Is Planned to a T, Is It a Protest?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
22, 2004, at 4.1 (“But for the protest groups, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg might as 
well be Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago in 1968.  Billyclub or no billyclub, they 
claim, his aim is to block dissent, to sanitize and strip it of all meaning.”). 
 151 Editorial, Sunday in the Park, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A20 (cautioning 
demonstrators that frustration over the courts’ rulings were not an excuse for law-
lessness). 
 152 Slackman, supra note 150, at 4.1 (“The city takes the view that it is simply trying 
to accommodate the protesters while at the same time safeguarding everyone else. 
The New York Police Department said it thought that it had achieved a reasonable 
compromise in allowing protesters to march past Madison Square Garden and still 
gather in large numbers in the street.”). 
 153 See infra notes 154–81. 
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Two groups of protesters filed a motion for preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin enforcement of the park’s permit scheme, and the 
district court consolidated the complaints into a single action by both 
National Council of Arab Americans and Act Now to Stop War and 
End Racism (ANSWER).154
The formal grounds for the Parks Department’s denial of the 
National Council of Arab Americans’ permit request was that the 
Great Lawn in Central Park had just been restored, and the space was 
not large enough to hold all of the protesters.155  The plaintiffs coun-
tered by stressing the unique significance of demonstrating on the 
Great Lawn on August 28, 2004.156  First, the coincidence of the dem-
onstrations in time and space with the Republican National 
Convention would make the protest more powerful at the desired lo-
cation than at another location.157  Second, the date marked the forty-
first anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s march on Washing-
ton, D.C.158  Finally, the forum had a history of protest without 
violence, and the Great Lawn was a historic place for people seeking 
justice in a non-violent fashion.159
Some of the alternative sites that the Parks Department offered 
included forums outside Manhattan, such as in Queens or the 
Bronx.160  The plaintiffs argued that the Great Lawn, if available, was 
the “only appropriate place” for the demonstration.161  The Depart-
ment did offer another venue within Central Park, but one that could 
accommodate no more than 50,000 people, a number much smaller 
than the plaintiffs’ anticipated turnout.162  In response to this offer, 
the plaintiffs again argued that the only location that was proper for 
their rally was the Great Lawn: “Plaintiffs argue that assembly on the 
Great Lawn is part of their political message, namely acceptance and 
equality of Arab Americans.”163  While the court noted this part of the 
Council’s argument, it placed little emphasis on it in reaching a final 
conclusion.164
 154 Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260, 262 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
 155 Id. at 261. 
 156 Id. at 262–63. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 262. 
 159 Id. at 263. 
 160 Nat’l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 262, 264. 
 163 Id. at 263. 
 164 Id. at 265–73. 
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The Parks Department also advanced justifications for refusing 
the Council’s use of the Great Lawn.165  Most importantly, the De-
partment cited concern for damage to the newly restored ground.166  
The defendants also hinted at concern over security as a justification 
for denying the permit, but did not clearly state it as a reason for the 
denial.167  The fact that the mere “allusion” to security concerns offers 
a significant justification for denial of the plaintiff’s permit under-
scores the power of such a justification in the “time, place, and 
manner” restrictions on speech. 
The district court concluded that the Parks Department’s restric-
tion on speech was narrowly tailored: “The Parks Department’s 
determination is not unconstitutional simply because this Court 
might have promoted the governmental interest in a different man-
ner or can conceive of some ‘less-speech-restrictive alternative.’”168  
Thus, the court decided it was not responsible for finding a way to al-
low this speech to take place at a venue the plaintiffs deemed 
uniquely appropriate for their event.  National Council of Arab Ameri-
cans shows how the protection for speech becomes more limited 
when the court does not require the government to employ the least 
restrictive alternative in its restriction of access to public forums. 
A parallel state court case was decided just after National Council 
of Arab Americans.  In United for Peace and Justice v. Bloomberg,169 a New 
York state court also denied the plaintiff’s application for a prelimi-
nary injunction.170  In its decision, the court followed some of the 
same reasoning of National Council of Arab Americans, but also seemed 
frustrated with United for Peace and Justice’s delay in filing its suit, 
accusing the plaintiff of coming to the court with “unclean hands.”171  
In addressing the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court, citing 
Ward, found that the permit guidelines did not unnecessarily burden 
the plaintiff’s right to speech.172
 165 Id. at 261. 
 166 Nat’l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 261. 
 167 Id. at 265 (“Defendants also have alluded to certain security concerns over hav-
ing the Great Lawn used for demonstrations.”). 
 168 Id. at 270 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799–800 
(1989)). 
 169 783 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
 170 Id. at 257.
 171 Id. at 259 (“Although plaintiff comes to court seeking equity, the above chro-
nology establishes plaintiff does not come to court with ‘clean hands,’ because 
plaintiff is guilty of inexcusable and inequitable delay.”).
 172 Id. at 262. 
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The Bloomberg court further addressed United for Peace and Jus-
tice’s complaints about the alternate location of West Street for its 
rally.173  The plaintiff argued that the line of sight would be poor from 
this venue, resulting in its message not being adequately conveyed.174  
Although the court recognized this problem, it gave little weight to 
it.175  The court determined that these problems would exist even if 
United for Peace and Justice received a permit for their desired three 
sites in Central Park.176  The Bloomberg court, however, simply did not 
accord special significance to the fact that the main portion of the 
rally would still occur on the Great Lawn, which had special import 
for conveying the plaintiff’s message.177  When first employing the 
Madsen test, the United States Supreme Court gave significantly more 
weight to whether the protesters at abortion clinics could effectively 
communicate their message than the New York court gave to the 
plaintiff’s claims in Bloomberg.178  For example, the Bloomberg court de-
termined it had no obligation to ensure that the plaintiff maximized 
the number of participants, its audience or its media exposure by at-
tempting to accommodate the plaintiff at the desired site.179  By 
contrast, the Madsen court gave these objectives more serious consid-
eration and attention.180
The Bloomberg court repeatedly expressed frustration at the 
plaintiff’s delay in seeking judicial relief in its opinion, denying 
United for Peace and Justice’s request for a preliminary injunction.  
When reprimanding the plaintiff for its delay, however, the court 
stated that the plaintiff’s desire for a rally in Central Park could have 
been accommodated if United for Peace and Justice had promptly 
sought judicial intervention.181  Although the court faulted the plain-
tiff for waiting to bring the action, its admission of the likelihood that 
 173 Id. at 262–63. 
 174 Id. at 263. 
 175 Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
 176 Id. (noting that “[c]ertainly, the problems plaintiff suggests with the line of 
sight along West Street are no greater than those presented by plaintiff's proposed 
event on three Central Park sites, two of which are separated from the Great Lawn by 
approximately one mile (and the Central Park Reservoir)”).
 177 Id. 
 178 See supra notes 81–98 and accompanying text. 
 179 Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 263. 
 180 See supra notes 81–102 and accompanying text. 
 181 Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (“Indeed, it is this Court's opinion that if plain-
tiff had filed the instant application in a timely fashion, operational plans could have 
been implemented to accommodate plaintiff's desire for a rally in Central Park, with 
adequate protection for the public and preserving the integrity of the park lands.”).
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the plaintiff’s event could be accommodated supports the conclusion 
that there is a less burdensome alternative than the current method. 
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE MADSEN TEST  BEYOND THE REALM OF 
INJUNCTIONS AND THE ABORTION CLINIC PROBLEM 
The City of New York has struggled with the appropriate way to 
accommodate protests because of the tension between allowing peo-
ple to be heard and keeping the city safe and functioning.182  As 
previously discussed, prior to the Republican National Convention, 
the City was confronted with another protest in which the petitioners 
wished to march past the United Nations building in opposition to 
the pending war in Iraq.183  In looking to potential alternatives, the 
City flatly refused to consider a march in any area of the city, in spite 
of the petitioner’s offer to consider alternate routes for the march.184  
The City also denied this option in spite of the fact that it allowed 
other parades and marches to continue in the city.185  When it denied 
United for Peace and Justice’s request, the City cited a lack of ade-
quate preparation time and distinguished the protest from annual 
parade events for which the City claimed were easier to plan.186
Had the district court applied the Madsen test to the City’s denial 
of the petitioner’s permit request and evaluated whether the regula-
tion or guideline “burdened no more speech than necessary to serve 
a significant government interest,” the court would likely have arrived 
at a different result than it did utilizing the more deferential standard 
set forth in Ward.  First, the court would engage in an analysis of 
whether the least restrictive alternative had been applied, rather than 
simply citing to Ward when it determined that the regulation left 
open ample alternative channels for communication.187  For example, 
in evaluating the proposed alternative of a stationary rally, the district 
court concluded that it was enough that the protesters would still be 
 182 See supra Part V and accompanying text for a discussion of the City’s attempts 
to balance these interests. 
 183 See supra notes 124–43 and accompanying text. 
 184 United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“While Plaintiff has not specifically offered to forego its march past 
the United Nations, as late as the evening of February 7, after an evidentiary hearing, 
Plaintiff was willing to discuss alternate march routes.  The City, however, was then 
and remains unequivocal in its position that it will not permit a march past the 
United Nations—or a march anywhere in Manhattan—in connection with the event, 
principally because of safety and security considerations.”).
 185 Id. at 26.  The City continued to allow events such as the Dominican Day pa-
rade, the Saint Patrick’s Day Parade, and the Puerto Rican Day Parade.  Id. 
 186 Id. at 26–27. 
 187 Id. at 30. 
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visible from the United Nations building.188  The Madsen court, how-
ever, when reviewing the constitutionality of the buffer zones outside 
of abortion clinics, paid special attention to the fact that the protest-
ers could still be seen and heard from outside the buffer zone.189  
Under the more deferential standard, there is no real concern for the 
fact that United for Peace and Justice’s message could only be ob-
served, rather than actually heard. 
Furthermore, in assessing the potential viability of certain alter-
natives, the court made a very cursory inquiry.  When it addressed the 
possibility of a buffer zone, the court took the police chief’s word that 
it would be difficult for such a buffer zone to be effective.190  Al-
though the buffer zones at abortion clinics sought to contain smaller 
crowds than the march proposed by United for Peace and Justice, 
there was little investigation as to how the six-lane road outside the 
United Nations building could be used to effectively secure the build-
ing while still allowing the protesters their fullest opportunity for 
demonstration. 
In addition, the City refused to allow any sort of parade or 
march in the city, although it granted such permits to other groups 
for cultural events.191  While the City explained that these events dif-
fered because they were annual and allowed it more time to 
prepare,192 the fact that it regularly allows such events underscores 
the fact that the City and its police force are capable of controlling 
large, moving events, and therefore have mechanisms in place for 
these types of events.  This evidence supports the notion that there 
could be another, less restrictive alternative available for United for 
Peace and Justice rather than a total ban on the march or any sort of 
mobile demonstration.  Not only could the City attempt to use these 
mechanisms outside the context of parades related to cultural events 
and holidays, but it could also adopt a “facilitation” approach to 
demonstration.  This approach allows demonstrators to protest rela-
tively undisturbed unless they break laws, and has been used in San 
Francisco with positive results.193
 188 See supra notes 127–35 and accompanying text. 
 189 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 190 United for Peace and Justice, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 25. 
 191 Id. at 25–26. 
 192 Id. at 26. 
 193 NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, RES. CALLING 
UPON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO PROTECT AND UPHOLD FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY (2004), available at http://webdocs. 
nyccouncil.info/attachments/61403.htm. 
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The application of the Madsen test to National Council of Arab 
Americans would also likely produce a different result.  If the district 
court applied the Madsen test to the Council’s petition for a prelimi-
nary injunction, the court would ask whether the Parks Department’s 
permit scheme burdened more speech than necessary to achieve the 
government’s objective.194  Because the Parks Department refused to 
grant a permit, the court would inquire whether the City’s stated ob-
jectives, preserving the Great Lawn and providing security, could be 
accomplished in another way.195
The City repeatedly stated its concern for weather conditions 
during the rally and the impact of a large assemblage of people on 
the Great Lawn if the weather was bad.196  Although the Council and 
the other groups that joined in the action could not practically have a 
rain date for their demonstration, the Parks Department gave no 
consideration to a conditional permit and offered the petitioners a 
rain site, rather than a rain date.  Furthermore, the sites the Parks 
Department did offer as alternatives were inadequate substitutes and 
would not pass under the Madsen test because the alternative sites 
gave little consideration to whether the protesters’ ideas and message 
would still be heard.197  The alternate sites the City proffered to the 
protesters included Flushing Meadow Park in Queens and Van Cort-
landt Park in the Bronx.198  The offer of alternative sites outside 
Manhattan showed little sensitivity to the petitioners’ desire to be 
seen and heard in the center of the city.  Placing the site outside of 
the city tucks away the protesters and their message, an effect the 
Madsen test attempts to prevent. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
Since the Ward decision and other decisions that preceded it, 
such as Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, there has been 
concern about the application of a standard that does not require the 
least restrictive alternative when suppressing speech in public forums.  
Some scholars have advocated a required use of the least restrictive 
alternative for all forms of speech, whether they are political or not.199  
 194 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). 
 195 Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 196 Id. at 261, 263–64. 
 197 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 198 Nat’l Council for Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 262. 
 199 See generally Paul A. Blechner, First Amendment: Supreme Court Rejection of the Least 
Restrictive Alternative Test, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 331, 356–57 (arguing for more pro-
tection for First Amendment freedoms: “Such a large measure of trust accorded to 
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Such a requirement, however, fails to take into account the important 
security concerns that exist today.  Thus, a standard that would ac-
count for the type of speech, as well as the government’s regulation 
of it, would be most appropriate.200  Because the self-government jus-
tification for First Amendment rights is the most widely agreed 
upon,201 the court should scrutinize the regulation of such speech in 
public forums most carefully and require that the government bur-
den no more speech than necessary in order to accomplish its 
objective.202  The free exchange of ideas and information is vital to 
the legitimate functioning of democracy, and therefore any interfer-
ence with such communication deserves careful scrutiny.  This 
standard was used in the challenges at abortion clinics.  In applying 
such a standard, there would be the hope that the Court’s vision of 
public forums as articulated in Hague, that the parks and streets of 
this country are still held in trust by the people for their use,203 would 
still be a viable goal.  The inadequacy of the current standard was re-
vealed in the United for Peace and Justice and National Council of Arab 
Americans decisions when potentially valuable political speech was 
suppressed during tumultuous times.  The court’s lack of inquiry into 
potentially less restrictive alternatives exposed the insufficiency of this 
standard.  Offering this enhanced protection for political speech 
would potentially strike a balance between enhancing the nation’s 
safety and still preserving its citizens’ liberty. 
 
legislators cannot be justified when [F]irst [A]mendment rights are at stake.  Where 
speech is of any protected category, the [F]irst [A]mendment requires that the legis-
lative branch be held to a more stringent standard.  The judiciary must protect this 
level of protection by acting as an anti-majoritarian body.”).
 200 But see id. at 360 (arguing that “[e]ven though requiring an equal nexus be-
tween regulation and interest may appear to be an overly broad prophylactic 
measure, providing protection for lesser protected speech is nevertheless necessary 
because (1) lesser types of speech are still protected speech, and (2) a weaker nexus 
creates opportunities for content-based regulations to be hidden under the guise of 
content-neutral regulations”).
 201 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 202 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). 
 203 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
